Rationalists get it seriously (and smugly) wrong

(Corrected post attribution 19/6/14, sorry permalink has to stay wrong)

I was surprised and a little disappointed to see this post from the British Humanists Rationalist Association in which, it seems to me, their prejudice prevents any kind of serious reflection.

I left this comment:

As a Christian, I find this comment a little strange, since to me it would be verging on the offensive to identify my faith with my nationality. I would not want to insult either fellow citizens of other faiths and none, nor fellow Christians of other nationalities, by pretending to any kind of intrinsic identity between the two.

I was disturbed by the 24% figure because it seemed to me to hint at an uncomfortably large number of people (whose religious practice is unknown) for whom professing ethnic adherence to “Christianity” has become the last acceptable way of expressing racism. I don’t see that as either Christian or patriotic.

Your post seems to me a bland and smugly self-congratulatory comment on a phenomenon that is more seriously worrying than the way you treat it.

Religion in the media

Nick Baines reports changes afoot in the world of reporting religion. It’s up at the BBC and down at the Times, it would seem. The former have appointed a new religion correspondent, the latter (says the bishop) is ceasing to have one.

He also goes on to note that a charity he chairs, the Sandford St Martin Trust is changing:

During the last year we have conducted a detailed strategy review and clarified that we wish not only to ‘promote excellence in religious broadcasting’, but also ‘to advocate for’ it.

I don’t wish to deny or devalue the role of broadcasting which explores how people and communities have lived and do live out their lives drawing on a traditioned wisdom and current practices of faith in God. But I do find myself wondering whether that term “religious broadcasting” is part of the problem.

What I would like to see is the promotion of excellently drawn religiously-shaped characters across the range of genre plot-lines. Or faith-informed perspectives being treated as significant contributions to the complexities of political, social, and ethical issues.

What, in brief, I would like is the normalisation of faith in the media, and not simply high quality productions to fill up the quota for some religious silo.

Tom Hollander’s vicar may have got a lot of publicity, but actually I’m more cheered to hear that Arthur Darvill’s vicar will return for series 2 of Broadchurch. Possible suspect in the first version, his vicar struggling with the immensity of what hit the town was suitably complex and relatively normal. Not hero, nor idiot, nor villain, but an integral part of the tapestry of the story. That normalisation within drama (as elsewhere) is something we need to see more.

A short-haired Saviour?

I’m sure there must be some short-haired images of Jesus around somewhere, but I can’t really think of any. Mostly he wears his hair long in picture Bibles, artwork and media representations. Indeed, long hair seems to be one of the most unifying features across all the many diverse Jesus images his followers and non-followers alike construct.

Yet it would seem to be the clearest implication of what is perhaps St Paul’s most bizarre argument (and one I suspect he can feel is getting away from him) that Jesus had short hair.

Does not nature itself teach you that if a man wears long hair, it is to his dishonour, but if a woman has long hair, it is her glory? (1 Cor 11:14-15a)

For Paul, a man’s short hair is so much the cultural norm that he sees it as nature (φύσις), despite the fact that it is obviously achieved by keeping natural growth in cultural check! For such a universal norm to be in place in Paul’s world, it makes it highly unlikely Jesus was some kind of Galilean exception.

Whether Paul had met Jesus is something for which there is no evidence one way or the other, but he must certainly have met a great many Palestinian Jews, and therefore they also must be presumed to conform to “nature”.

The one possible exception to this is the growing of hair while under a vow. Luke twice refers to this custom: once in relation to Paul himself (Ac 18:18), and once in relation to four others with whom Paul associates himself (Ac 21:23-24). What we don’t know is how long these vows typically lasted, and therefore how long the hair grew. Nor do we know how much, symbolically, this was a representation of being removed from the world. and therefore not seen as part of “nature”. However, what is being described is clearly temporary.

Despite some odd attempts to link Matthew’s mysteriously unsourced prophecy “He will be called a Nazorean” (Matt 2:23) with a Nazirite vow, there’s rather more evidence of Jesus enjoying the kind of drinking life that would make any such vow even shorter lived than Paul’s. Therefore some kind of semi-permanent Nazirite vow is hardly a plausible way to restore Jesus’ hippy hair-style.

I think the presumption that short hair is natural points to a pervasive cultural norm, which Paul expects to be shared by the Corinthians, both Greek and Jew, the surrounding culture and the other early Christian leaders the Corinthians may prefer to follow.

When such an obviously cultural convention is simply “nature”, it would be highly unlikely that Jesus could be an exception to this, without it drawing comment somewhere in the record. Jesus, we may conclude, had short hair.

What have the Christians ever done for us?

It seems that Mr Cameron has annoyed some people by proclaiming that Britain is a Christian country. Oddly Mr Brown didn’t seem to annoy them half as much when he said it. Can’t think why Dave would upset Polly more than Gordo, can we?

But a group of BHA celebs has written to the Telegraph to point out that Britain is not a Christian country, apart from a rather annoying “narrow constitutional sense”. Indeed, Simon Singh feels so strongly about how peskily annoying a constitution is to modern concepts of civic reality that he seems to have signed the letter twice.

I couldn’t help but imagine something like the following dialogue:

“Britain is not a Christian country.”

“Apart from having a monarch crowned by the Church.”

“OK, Britain is not a Christian country, apart from having a monarch crowned by the Church.”

“And 26 bishops in the house of Lords”

“OK, Britain is not a Christian country, apart from having a monarch crowned by the Church, and 26 bishops in the house of Lords.”

“And beginning every day in Parliament with prayers.”

“OK, Britain is not a Christian country, apart from having a monarch crowned by the Church, and 26 bishops in the house of Lords, and beginning every day in Parliament with prayers.”

“And having over 1400 years of history intertwining Christianity, state and people, to make us what we are today.”

“OK, Britain is not a Christian country, apart from having a monarch crowned by the Church, and 26 bishops in the house of Lords, and beginning every day in Parliament with prayers, and having over 1400 years of history intertwining Christianity, state and people, to make us what we are today.”

“And having over 50% of the population identifying themselves as Christian in the last census.”

“OK, Britain is not a Christian country, apart from having a monarch crowned by the Church, and 26 bishops in the house of Lords, and beginning every day in Parliament with prayers, and having over 1400 years of history intertwining Christianity, state and people, to make us what we are today, and having over 50% of the population identifying themselves as Christian in the last census.”

“OK, Britain is not a Christian country apart from … look this is getting a bit silly.”

“And also with you.”

In fact I think there’s room for a considerable debate about how we consciously respond to the ways our culture has transformed and is transforming, and in what ways “Christian country” language works or doesn’t work. By and large, Christian is a problematic adjective. But there is something so gloriously silly in that “not Christian apart from constitutionally and legally” argument of the letter, that It doesn’t seem a very useful place to start a serious conversation.

There is, in short, such a blind and outmodedly modernist faith in “the necessary truths of reason” that the letter writers seem to feel that “the accidental truths of history” can be entirely ignored.

Creation not debt repayment: John and the Cross

One of the inevitabilties of Holy Week and Easter, it seems, is a sermon, meditation or blog post on the Greek of Jesus final word from the cross in John’s gospel: “It is finished.” (No links: I’m not getting at any one specific person or instance) And nothing wrong with that; after all, when would be a more appropriate time?
flung_stars_into_space

But I do find myself bristling at the easy assumption that in this saying Jesus himself gives us the final interpretation of his sacrifice as a penal substitutionary atonement. “Tetelestai”, the preacher says (rolling the word round his tongue and emphasising the apparent veracity of the interpretation with a rare excursion into Greek) Jesus said: “Paid in full.” and from that he (it usually is a he!) segues into the whole penal substitution thing.

I shall lay to one side any questioning of the historical naïveté which assumes John is simply recording what happened. I shan’t even comment on the obvious problem that John’s story is in Greek, and yet it is highly unlikely even on the most historicist reading of the gospel that a first century Palestinian Jew made his dying declaration in a foreign language, and with our preacher’s modern Erasmian pronunciation to boot.

No. I shall content myself with arguing that this was not what John intended as the primary meaning of his text. I grant you that John often seems deliberately to have opened his text to multiple meanings and plural readings, and it is not impossible that his choice of words does carry the added ambiguity of payment. But I think there are cogent reasons for saying his primary meaning is different.

First, it has to be said that the attestation of “tetelestai” – τετέλεσται as a word prefixing receipts referred to by Moulton and Milligan’s classic lexicon is largely 2nd century (and Egyptian).But that simply urges caution.

Next comes John’s language of sin. He consistently, and without variation of style, uses the language of hamartia (ἁμαρτία) / hamartanō (ἁμαρτάνω) / hamartōlos (ἁμαρτωλός). This is the metaphor for “missing the mark”, or erring. The language of debt is missing as a metaphor for sin in John.

But then there is a more positive, but not exact pointer. Although John only uses the verb “to finish – τελέω” at the cross, he does make use elsewhere in the gospel of the very closely related verb “to complete – τελειόω” here and elsewhere.

Here, it is “that the scripture might be completed” that Jesus says “It is finished.” (19:28,30). Elsewhere in the gospel John appears to use the word complete much as the word finish. So:

  • My food is to do the will of him who sent me and to complete (τελειώσω) his work. (4:34)
  • The works that the Father has given me to complete (τελειώσω), the very works that I am doing, testify on my behalf that the Father has sent me. (5:36)
  • I glorified you on earth by finishing (τελειώσας) the work that you gave me to do. (17:4)

In this context the second of those is particularly interesting. The context is the debate about Jesus healing a man on the Sabbath. As part of the debate which follows, Jesus justifies working on the sabbath (including this work of healing) as follows: “My Father is still working, and I also am working.” God has not yet reached his sabbath rest, the end of his work, and so Jesus sees no need to keep it.

If we place that understanding into the narrative of the gospel, then Jesus says “It is finished” to complete the scripture, at the end of Friday afternoon. Jesus rests in the tomb on the seventh day having finished his and the Father’s work, and then on the first day of the week, while it is still dark … and we’re back, more allusively to that “In the beginning …” by which John signalled all along he was telling the story of creation in which what came to being in Jesus was life, and the light of all people, the light that shines in the darkness.

The language, and the narrative logic, seem to me to work together to suggest that what is finished on the cross, as far as John is concerned, is first and foremost the work of (new) creation. I wouldn’t care to rule out other meanings entirely, but I think that any interpretation which makes debt primary is listening more to a particular tradition than the text John wrote.

Historical Jesus criteria and the words from the Cross

I started this train of thought while keeping my lips tight shut as many colleagues (with a theologically misplaced enthusiasm) were singing Stuart Townend’s lines “the Father turns his face away / as wounds which mar the Chosen One
 / bring many sons to glory”. The power of a good tune to make people sing things (i hope) they’d never say is quite astonishing.

But I went from pondering that and what biblical texts it could possibly have in mind, to the way in which (it seems to me) there’s a general privileging of “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” as the most important and (as I think they are implicitly portrayed) the most historically plausible of the words from the cross.

The theological privileging owes a great deal to Moltmann, and has at least these drivers: the human Jesus is more contemporary than the divine Christ, the problem of theodicy is more pressing than any theology of salvation, and divine impassibility has become part of a presumed Greek contamination of a supposedly “biblical” and Hebrew gospel. (The dismissal of impassibility is one of the key areas this outmoded and ahistorical contrast lives on.)

The historical privileging is no doubt related because it is so congenial to the theological account. However, and this is where I finally get to my point, it seems to me that this is one of those cases where the traditional criteria for the historical Jesus quest live on. It is plausible enough in context that a first-century Jew should quote a psalm, and sufficiently embarrassing on the lips of Jesus that the early church would not have invented it (but not embarrassing, it would seem to Mark or Matthew!). Indeed, Luke and John both get rid of it, and if it has left its mark anywhere else in the New Testament, it might be in the alternative (and in my view correct) reading of Hebrews 2:9, “apart from God – χωρὶς θεοῦ” which scribal orthodoxy (and embarrassment?) has made “by the grace of God ῏χἀριτι θεοῦ”.

On the other hand, in Luke’s gospel, it is just as possible that a pious Jewish martyr, not least one who seems to have expected if not embraced his death, could just as plausibly pray what became a model for many Christians: “Into your hands I commit my spirit.” (Psalm 31:5)

Yes, it is congenial to Luke’s theology as far as most people read him, and is echoed in the story of Stephen, and is judged more acceptable for most modern reconstructions of the early church. On the other hand, Mark’s solitary and ambiguous cry is highly congenial to his gospel, and to his misunderstood Jesus being a lonely hero at very turn. Jesus’ cry in Mark is no less of a pattern with the author’s theological and literary concerns than that of his Lukan counterpart.

And so I ask: is there any good historical ground for the theological privileging of Mark’s solitary word from the cross over those narrated in Luke and John? Or is it just another case of a misapplication of dubious criteria from a past age of questing?

The Nigel Evans case: media hysteria and not-guilty verdicts

I have no wish to pour any cold water on Nigel Evans’ relief and delight at his acquittal today. It must have been awful for him, as an innocent man to go through the ordeal of such a public trial on such personal matters.

However, I think we should all be a little bit worried at another example of what looks a bit like a trend following high profile verdicts of “not guilty”. Today, as in the recent cases of Andrew Lancel, Michael Le Vell and William Roache (what is it about the law and Corrie?) there are people queuing up to ask why the charges were brought in the first place.

So, here’s former shadow Home Secretary (who might be expected to know something about the system!) David Davis:

This case has highlighted serious concerns over how the police and the Crown Prosecution Service bring sexual offence cases to court.
In particular we must now review the process whereby the police and the Crown Prosecution Service put together a large number of lesser, subsidiary cases in order to reinforce one serious case when prosecuting sexual offences.
It is clear from the way that this case proceeded that there is a risk of a serious injustice being done to an innocent man, and I would call on the attorney general to urgently review this issue.

They may well be questions to be asked which could I think, pretty broadly come under the heading of “The Savile Effect”.

It appears that once you’re dead, you’re automatically guilty of every allegation, but if you’re still alive questions must be asked about why police think a pattern of serious allegations is sufficient evidence to bring a case to court.

But surely the point is that courts, and juries, exist to test the strength of the case. It is not for the CPS or the police to settle questions of “reasonable doubt”.

There could be little more damaging for our court system than for the public generally to believe that the CPS and police only brought cases against guilty people. Every time it turns out that a case has been brought against an innocent man or woman, it is a sign that the system is robust enough not to collude in either a police state, or a salacious, ravening and hysterical media.

Yes, there are questions to be asked. But they are as much about media freedom and restriction, and about the post-Yewtree culture of hysteria around sexual allegations as they are about anything else.

But the last thing we want is politicians colluding with the media in reinforcing any expectation that only the guilty will ever be charged. That kind of “no smoke without fire” attitude to the courts is the surest way to guarantee future miscarriages of justice.

Today, above all, is a sign that the jury system remains our best safeguard against prosecutorial zeal and trial by media. Nigel Evans has won today, but so has society.

The strange absence of the empty tomb

tomb.png

The historian Philip Jenkins offers a very good summary of the odd imbalance about the resurrection in the New Testament. The empty tomb is central to the gospel narratives. There is no explicit evidence of it anywhere else.

The question he poses is expressed in two ways. First

All the New Testament writings believe in Christ’s survival beyond death, in some kind of Resurrection. To the best of my knowledge, though, other than the gospels, none refers to that empty tomb story. That does not necessarily mean that they do not know the story, or do not believe it, but they do not use it anything like a modern apologist would. Why not?

And in conclusion:

Suppose I face an atheist critic, who makes the following argument. Yes, he says, early Christians believed that they encountered the risen Jesus, that they had visions, but these visions had no objective reality. They just arose from the hopes and expectations of superstitious disciples. Even then, Christians saw that Resurrection in spiritual, pneumatic, terms. Only after a lengthy period, some forty years in fact, did the church invent stories to give a material, bodily basis to that phenomenon, and the empty tomb was the best known example.

That is, of course, a question that many have asked, although often without the nuance. Many quite liberal believers would also want to aver a vision-based experience eventually being superseded by literal (and fictional) narratives. The Jewish category of midrash is regularly abused in this context.

I’ve expressed my own view in the comments to Jenkins’ post, which is that I still think Paul was aware of an empty tomb tradition, though I must admit it is an argument by inference: first inference from his language of body, secondly inference from how belief in the resurrection of Jesus does and doesn’t modify his apocalyptic framework.

As I said there:

I think the nearest that Paul comes is in his convoluted discussion of bodies in 1 Cor 15. It is the body, which is transformed, no longer being animated by “soul” but by “spirit”. Clearly the language of body steers Paul away from any more obviously Platonic models of psyche / soul. Whether that language is sufficient to make a Pauline belief in an empty tomb probable is open to discussion, but I’m inclined to think that given the range of options open to him, it does.

I would be inclined to adduce one further general pattern in support of this. As far as we can tell, Jesus’ resurrection is interpreted in the earliest texts as a foretaste of a cosmic transformation of the material world. It may modify the Pharasaic and more general apocalyptic understanding of resurrection by applying that language to an individual rather than a universal and corporate aspect, but it doesn’t seem to modify the understanding of it as what we call a “physical” and “social” transformation. Again, to my mind that implies an understanding which seems more congruent with a belief in a change happening to Jesus’ material body.

It is, however, the case that the New Testament data raise the question more sharply than simple conservative apologetics ever admits. Jenkins makes a particularly effective statement of the problem.

Biblical Publicity? reviewing “God’s Agents”

God's Agents.jpgGod’s Agents: Biblical Publicity in Contemporary England. The title certainly worked to catch my eye! It’s an ethnographic exploration of the work of the Bible Society, by Matthew Engelke, and anthropologist currently working at the LSE.

A preface sets out the terms of his study, based on participant observation over a three and a half year period, with roughly 15 months of that being given to full time engagement with the Bible Society’s work. This is followed by a lengthy introduction in which he sets the scene with a short historical note and a more detailed present description of the society, focussing particularly on its “Bible advocacy” work.

It is this advocacy that he means by “biblical publicity”. It is about how the Bible Society seek to gain a hearing for the message of the scriptures in a culture that no longer knows it. It is about seeking ways of presenting the Bible as a “credible” text for 21st century English people. And it is about public religion: the place of faith in the public square. One of the running themes of the book is how this work is a response to an attitude usefully expressed in Alastair Campbell’s soundbite on behalf of Tony Blair: “We don’t do God”.

The first chapter describes and reflects on a Christmas decorations project the Bible Society engaged in in their home town (well the town where their offices are) of Swindon, together with some other activities. The project – having some socially designed angel-kites in a key central area, being in constant motion because of the wind. Engelke reflects on the use of signs which are ambiguous – intentionally undetermined to invite people to engage.

He also reflects on the Lyfe project, where Bible study groups were encouraged to do their Bible study in a public place, coffee house or pub. In this, Bible study is seen as a natural activity for Christians, and coffee ships and pubs as natural places to meet. He brings these themes together by suggesting there is a task here of creating ambience: God as part of the normal background noise of contemporary life.

His second chapter looks at a relatively early Bible advocacy approach of their three “Campaigns to Culture” where they tried to find ways of placing the Bible in public as a contemporary book. The largest of these involved a series of events in Manchester including a significant advertising campaign, which sought to riddle rather than preach. He explores what the Bible Society means by “culture” and how it tries to find culturally acceptable ways of drawing attention and provoking thought within it. One of the issues that emerges from this is just how much they run into a brick wall: many people simply think the Bible is too old to be interesting.

In chapter three he spends time with the Society’s Parliamentary Officer. In most respects, this is the most traditionally evangelical piece of work described here, with a piece of networking, relationship building work developed especially through the (nowadays reshaped in the manner of an evangelical Christian Union) group Christians in Parliament. It does offer some opportunity to reflect on how (if at all) Christian MPs can articulate their faith as informing their positions, and in what arenas. In that sense it begins to introduce the idea that will dominate the last three chapters of the book: public reason.

This final half of the book covers the work of what is 9n my view the Bible Society’s most interesting project, the sponsoring of the semi-independent (or at least semi-detached) think-tank Theos. Chapter 4 covers its launch and early projects, Chapter 5 covers how it seeks to use the media, which is the arena in which a think tank lives of dies, and especially reflects on how it engages in media conflict with atheist organisations over the issues of the day.

The final main chapter looks at a major project to use the 200th anniversary of Darwin’s birth (and 150th anniversary of The Origin of the Species). This project sought to put across a consistent message that science and Bible can be friends. In the process it staged a major public debate in Westminster Abbey (site of Darwin’s memorial) between atheists and believers on the relationship between faith and science. It also commissioned some research that perhaps could have been made more of, on trying to understand creationists. (Theos, as Engelke describes it, wasn’t really interested in understanding them: it wanted to combat them just as much as it wanted to combat the aggressive atheists like Dawkins.)

The conclusion adds only a little to the substance of the main chapters. It might have been more helpful to give a little more time to the sections which located it among the long-standing anabaptist think tank Ekklesia, and the newer in the ring (political but with theological commitments related to Radical Orthodoxy) ResPublica.

Let me add a few short reflections to this description. First, and most importantly, this is by and large a very readable book, both in its language and the story and character driven way it has of describing the work it covers. The first chapter (unfortunately) is the one with the most jargon, although most of the time (until its conclusion really) it’s not too inaccessible. But “fractally recursive conception of publicity” or “sensory semiotics” (both p63) are not helpful to the average reader drawn in by the story, especially since they are not well explained.

I think the way Engelke develops the concept of ambience is helpful, and offers some ways to reflect on future practice, and how the church, with its members and organisations, seeks to use public media. It’s worth pondering the idea of finding ways of making or keeping aspects of faith, mentions of God, a feature of cultural ambience not just in the “high culture” of classical art and architecture, choral music, and literary allusion, but within “popular culture”. (That’s a rather pre-postmodern distinction, if useful in this context.)

He also has some useful, if underdeveloped reflections on some of the odd ways in which the team use the word “culture”. Not least he notes that “The very idea of a Church-Culture split is indicative of the ways in which the logic of secularism has shaped this strand of Christian social action in contemporary England.” (p231). It might have been helpful to see rather more teasing out of this: surely the division between the two may mask the ways in which the church exists within and is shaped by culture. And how do we distinguish a sub-culture from a counter-culture, a harbinger of future change, a movement of resistance, or a nostalgic after-image?

Finally, I note an area where I wish he had been more critically reflective. It seems to me that the various projects he describes reify the BIble in ways I’m not entirely sure work. It is talked about as if it is a thing in itself, and that everybody knows what we’re talking about. Yet Engelke describes, for example, one bit of the Bible Society (Theos) going into fairly full-blooded combat with creationists while other staff are creationists (p223).

The book (or at least the texts) for actual BIbles are rather replaced with iPads, phones and printouts, is situated n communities of interpretation. Talk about “the Bible” may disguise the necessity of interpretation, never mind hide the complexity of which books are included. I deduce from some of the ways he comments on and describes things that Engelke himself is an evangelical Christian. If that has made him choose an interesting subject, and then using his professional skills to write an enjoyable, readable and thought-provoking book, all to the good. But I wonder if it has prevented him from seeing a very pertinent issue: how the focus on “the Bible” being a voice in contemporary culture is itself something that needs reflecting on.

Scripture, prophecy and Inspiration in error?

For those celebrating the festival of the Annunciation today, the first two readings at mass share something unusual in common.

The first reading is the most famous, and includes the sign Ahaz didn’t want still being given him:

the young woman is with child and shall bear a son, and shall name him Immanuel (Isaiah 7:14)

The second is the letter to the Hebrews

when Christ came into the world, he said, “Sacrifices and offerings you have not desired, but a body you have prepared for me; (Hebrews 10:5)

In the case of the first, the Greek translation famously narrows the semantic range of the Hebrew ‘almah (young woman) by translating it with the Greek word for “virgin” – parthenos. It is this incompetent, if not mistaken, Greek translation that certainly Matthew, and probably Luke, and most of the church after the first century acclaim as an inspired prophecy of the virginal conception of Jesus.

In the second instance, the author of Hebrews places the words of Psalm 39:7 in the Greek translation he knew on the lips of Christ. But the words uttered in the Hebrew version (Psalm 40:6 – Psalm numbering between the Hebrew and its Greek translation is usually one number out!) say something different: “you have given me an open ear” is the NRSV’s take on the Hebrew.

Speculating how the translator got from the Hebrew original to his Greek version is a matter of some dispute but no certainty. Either he has somehow misread the word “ears” as “body”, or he has made a creative interpretative decision, perhaps taking “my ears you have made (or restored)” as a metonym for making the whole body. Is there possibly a hint of the clay man of Genesis 2, and the ears finished as the last detail? Either way, it is in the end generally seen as another example of incompetent translation.

And so we have two OT verses which are read as prophetic of the incarnation, and treated as inspired by those who quote them in the NT. Yet it is only in a poor, if not erroneous translation, that they become regarded as God’s prophetic word.

That ought to be enough to complicate any theology of scripture.

ventures in christian humanism

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